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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have experienced phenomenal growth over
the past decade. They are typically deployed in human-inaccessible terrains to
monitor and collect time-critical and delay-sensitive events. There have been
several studies on the use of WSN in different applications. All such studies have
mainly focused on Quality of Service (QoS) parameters such as delay, loss, jitter
etc. of the sensed data. Security provisioning is also an important and challeng-
ing task lacking in all previous studies. In this paper, we propose a Sybil attack
detection scheme for a cluster-based hierarchical network mainly deployed to
monitor forest wildfire. We propose a two-tier detection scheme. Initially, Sybil
nodes and their forged identities are detected by high-energy nodes. However, if
one or more identities of a Sybil node sneak through the detection process, they
are ultimately detected by the two base stations. After Sybil attack detection,
an optimal percentage of cluster heads are elected and each one is informed
using nomination packets. Each nomination packet contains the identity of an
elected cluster head and an end user’s specific query for data collection within a
cluster. These queries are user-centric, on-demand and adaptive to an end user
requirement. The undetected identities of Sybil nodes reside in one or more
clusters. Their goal is to transmit high false-negative alerts to an end user for
diverting attention to those geographical regions which are less vulnerable to
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a wildfire. Our proposed approach has better network lifetime due to efficient
sleep-awake scheduling, higher detection rate and low false-negative rate.
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Network, Sybil Attack Detection, Wildfire
Monitoring, Queries, Cluster Head, LEACH
1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) comprise of numerous miniature sensor
nodes working together to monitor and collect data of interest [1]. These nodes
are characterized by scarcity of their resources in terms of battery power, com-
putation, storage and available bandwidth. They are typically deployed in a
remote and hostile location to perform monitoring and data reporting tasks.
Their limited resources need to be utilized efficiently to prolong network life-
time and throughput. These networks have found their applications in various
domains such as automated irrigation system [2], telemonitoring system for
healthcare [3], forest fire monitoring [4] and air pollution monitoring system [5].
Forest fires, also known as wild fires, are calamities which cause significant
damages to human race and natural resources. These fires ignite because of
environmental changes, human negligence or the combination of both. In coun-
tries like Australia, wildfires are frequently happening events because of its hot
and dry climate. As a result of heat waves, extensive and fatal wildfires arise
each year causing significant damages to infrastructure and human lives. On
Saturday, 7th February 20091, the state of Victoria saw its worst bushfires as
a result of excessive high temperature, low relative humidity and high winds.
These bushfires claimed 173 precious lives and caused significant damages to
the infrastructure.
Wildfire terrains are hazardous and human-inaccessible, and require imme-
diate reporting of time-critical and delay-sensitive events. WSNs are extensively
used for wildfire monitoring to ensure that time-stamped events are instantly
1(http://www.blacksaturdayfires.com/
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reported to a base station located outside a sensor field. Hefeeda and Bagheri [6]
proposed the design of a WSN for an early wildfire detection system. They mod-
elled the wildfire detection problem as a k-coverage problem [7] by employing
an overpopulated static WSN. They used a distributed k-coverage algorithm for
solving coverage issues within a forest to attain better accuracy. Sahin [8] pro-
posed a wildfire detection scheme based on thermal data and animal behaviour.
Sensor nodes were attached with animals to form a mobile biological WSN for
detecting a possible wildfire on the basis of panic behaviour. Garc´ıa et al. [9]
proposed a simulation environment for creating a model of a fire based on the
analysis of captured data and geographical information. The main objective of
this scheme was to automatically determine the geographical location and di-
rection of a wildfire for transmission of alert signals to an end user. Dlamini [10]
used Bayesian networks to determine abiotic, biotic and human factors which
influence the occurrence of a wildfire. Furthermore, historical datasets were
used to detect the possibility of a fire in remote geographical areas of Swazi-
land. Ha et al. [11] developed a simulation model for monitoring the possible
outbreak of a wildfire. They designed an efficient cluster-based hierarchical pro-
tocol to reduce the overall energy consumption of sensor nodes. The protocol
forms a multilayer cluster-based hierarchical network to reduce the number of
transmission hops to a central base station. The proposed scheme reduces the
delay incurred in transmission of sensitive alert packets from the nodes located
in vicinity of a wildfire.
The use of WSNs for wildfire monitoring is a well-studied research topic and
there exists lot of research in this context. However, all previous studies focused
mainly on the improvement of QoS parameters of the collected data. Their main
objective is to collect time-critical sensitive data and report them to a centralized
base station without further delay. None of the previous studies focuses on the
security aspects of the network in general and the data collected from the net-
work in particular. Like any other application, security provisioning is a major
challenging issue in wildfire monitoring application. The resource-constrained
nature of WSNs coupled with the remote and intimidating terrains of a forest
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makes security provisioning become a daunting challenge. Furthermore, WSNs
are left unattended after initial deployment. In the absence of human interven-
tion, an adversary may capture critical alert packets, maliciously manipulates
them and transmits to a base station. It may transmit false-negative alerts to
a base station in order to mislead it about a particular geographical region. In
doing so, attention of an end user is diverted to those regions which are less
vulnerable to a possible wildfire. The absence of human intervention along with
remote and in-accessible terrains of a forest may allow an adversary to forge
multiple illicit identities at a given time, i.e., a Sybil attack, to influence the
outcome of any decision taken by an end user.
In this paper, we propose a Sybil attack detection scheme for a wildfire mon-
itoring application using a cluster-based hierarchical architecture. The major
contributions of this paper are summarized below.
1. A two-tier detection scheme is proposed which operates at two levels. Ini-
tially, Sybil identities are detected by the high-energy nodes at a lower
level. However, due to the error-prone communication links within a for-
est, one or more identities of the Sybil nodes may sneak through the detec-
tion mechanism employed at high-energy nodes. To detect such identities,
we employ a higher level detection mechanism at the two base stations.
The ultimate objective of a two-tier detection scheme is to prevent the par-
ticipation of Sybil nodes in cluster head selection. Although the sneaked
Sybil nodes are prevented by the base stations from participation in cluster
head selection, these nodes can still participate in network communication
as non-cluster heads. They associate themselves with one or more cluster
heads as member nodes in order to transmit their data to the base sta-
tions. These sneaked Sybil nodes provide high false-negative readings to
their respective cluster heads in order to mislead an end user. The pur-
pose of any false-negative reading is to detract the attention of the base
stations or an end user from highly sensitive regions to those which are
less vulnerable to a wildfire within a forest. The two base stations ensure
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that the false-negative readings of sneaked Sybil nodes are detected and
discarded before reaching an end user.
2. An energy consumption-based Sybil attack detection scheme is proposed
in which one or more forged identities of a Sybil node are detected based
on their energy consumption.
3. After Sybil nodes detection, the base stations elect an optimal percentage
of cluster heads to collect time-critical and delay-sensitive alert packets
within a forest. The elected cluster heads are advertised through nomi-
nation packets. Each nomination packet contains the identity of a cluster
head and an end user’s specific query. Query is a simple and declarative
programming logic enabling an end user to collect data according to pre-
defined conditions [12]. Once these conditions are met, each node wakes
up, senses the environment, collects data and transmits to a nearest base
station. Queries efficiently schedule the duty cycling of each node and as
a result, reduces their energy consumption.
4. Two different types of queries, i.e., spatial and on-demand, are used to
collect data. The assignment of these queries depends on the requirements
of end user and the nature of collected data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, related
works from literature for Sybil attack detection, wildfire monitoring and cluster-
based hierarchical networks are provided. In Section III, we present the design
considerations for a wildfire monitoring application. In Section IV, we provide
a detailed explanation of our proposed scheme of Sybil attack detection in a
forest wildfire monitoring environment. Our experimental work is provided in
Section V. Finally, the paper is concluded and directions for future research are
provided in Section VI.
2. Related Work
In this section, we provide the related research works on wildfire monitoring,
Sybil attack detection and cluster-based hierarchical networks. An adversary
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carries out Sybil attacks on the routing layer of a WSN, hence, we choose cluster-
based hierarchical architecture as the underlying platform because cluster head
selection and cluster formation are part of network layer. Another reason for
choosing these protocols is their energy-efficient nature in data transmission and
communication [13]. In this section, we provide existing literature on cluster-
based hierarchical networks followed by wildfire monitoring schemes and Sybil
attack detection techniques.
In cluster-based hierarchical routing protocols, such as Low-Energy Adaptive
Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) [14] and Stable Election Protocol (SEP) [15],
the nodes organize themselves into clusters. A cluster head gathers data from
member nodes within each cluster, aggregates it and relays it back to a remote
base station. Within a cluster, the neighbouring member nodes may detect
similar data. In order to reduce data redundancy, each cluster head performs
local data aggregation to eliminate similar data patterns which enhances the
quality of data required for decision-making [16]. These protocols operate in
rounds, and, in each round, a new set of cluster heads are elected for a uniform
distribution of energy load within a network.
In literature, there exist various works on wildfire monitoring using an un-
derlying cluster-based hierarchical platform. Ha et al. [11] proposed Energy-
efficient Fire Monitoring Protocol (EFMP), which operates in three states namely,
watch, slave and master. In a watch state, the nodes observe the detection of
a possible wildfire. Among all the cluster heads, the one which first detects
a fire, known as master head, transforms itself into master state. The master
head informs all other cluster heads which transform themselves to slave state
in order to act as slave heads within the network. In this fashion, a layered
hierarchical architectural model is formed. Irrespective of master or slave head,
all the cluster heads collect data within their clusters. However, only a master
head is eligible to transmit the data to a base station. All slave heads transmit
their data to a master head which aggregates the data and transmits to a base
station. EFMP reduces energy consumption because of master and slave head
concepts.
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Aslan et al. [4] proposed a simulation framework to monitor and detect a
possible forest fire. The operation of the nodes depends on terrain, current
weather forecasts and season of the year. Upon network deployment, the sensor
nodes associate themselves with their nearest cluster heads. Each cluster head
assigns transmission slots to member nodes to avoid contention for transmission
on a wireless link. Furthermore, each cluster head has the ability to transform
the member nodes into sleep mode in a Round Robin fashion to minimize their
energy consumption. In the event of a fire detection, the nodes in close vicinity
of a fire alter their normal transmission patterns and react more aggressively. If
a fire ignites near a cluster head, it needs to immediately elect the most suitable
member node as a replacement cluster head.
Zhang et al. [17] proposed a cluster-based hierarchical WSN to detect a
possible wildfire. Sensor nodes were deployed to measure relative humidity and
temperature readings within a forest. The cluster heads collect alarm packets
from member nodes and transmit to a gateway node which ultimately delivers
it to a centralized monitoring computer.
Yoon et al. [18] proposed a reliable wildfire monitoring system for a sparsely
deployed WSN. The proposed scheme is reactive [19] in nature because the
nodes remain in sleep mode and wake up only when an event is detected. While
awake, each node remains in normal or in an alert mode for transmission of
captured data without further delay. Moreover, the authors proposed separate
routing paths for normal data and delay-sensitive data.
Ballari et al. [20] studied the behaviour of nodes within a forest. The au-
thors proposed a mobility constraint model for providing adequate coverage to
such events. They argued that the risk factors of a possible wildfire ignition
characterise the coverage density of the nodes. Those areas which are more
vulnerable to a possible wildfire occurrence require higher coverage densities.
To provide accurate readings of the happening events, the nodes need to move
toward hotspots to ensure a complete network coverage.
In WSNs, communication over an error-prone wireless channel exposes nodes
to various types of malicious activities. Among them is Sybil attack where an
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adversary forges multiple identities at a given time to mislead legitimate nodes
into believing that they are having many neighbours [21].
Newsome et al. [22] proposed a radio resource testing approach for detecting
forged identities. They assumed that a sensor node was incapable of simulta-
neous transmission or reception on a single radio. Moreover, a physical node
may forge multiple identities but is incapable to use a single channel for these
identities at a given time. Apart from radio resource testing, they also proposed
a key validation approach for the random key pre-distribution. However, it re-
quires excessive resources on part of each node and is computationally complex
requiring ample amount of memory space.
Ssu et al. [23] proposed a scheme based on the assumption that probability of
two nodes having exactly the same set of neighbours was extremely low provided
that a network had a high node density. They argued that forged identities
typically had the same set of neighbours because they were all associated with
the same physical device. Therefore, the presence of a malicious node can easily
be detected by checking the neighbourhood of a suspected victim of a Sybil
attack.
Demirbas and Song [24] proposed a Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
based solution for a Sybil attack detection. They argued that although an RSSI
was a time-varying parameter and unreliable in nature, using RSSI ratio from
multiple receivers might be used for a Sybil attack detection.
Chen et al. [25] proposed an identity-based detection scheme for Sybil and
spoofing attacks in WSNs. Their proposed approach uses a detector to identity
malicious activities of the malevolent entities capable of adjusting their trans-
mission power. The detector locates the positions of such entities and prevent
them from network participation.
All these existing schemes focus either on wildfire monitoring with an under-
lying cluster-based hierarchical platform or a Sybil attack detection scheme used
with flat network topology. The existing wildfire monitoring techniques do not
address any security challenges incurred within a forest while a flat topology
suffers from flooding and implosion within a network [19]. These shortcom-
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ings motivate us to fill the research gap by proposing a Sybil attack detection
scheme for a wildfire monitoring application. We propose two different detec-
tion techniques for a possible Sybil attack followed by a centralized cluster head
selection approach. Similar to Distributed Energy-Efficient Clustering with Im-
proved Coverage (DEECIC) algorithm [26], the residual energy of each node
plays a crucial role in cluster head selection. Apart from the residual energy,
our cluster head selection technique relies on the previous history of selection
and geographical location of each node. We use different types of threshold-
based queries to collect data within each cluster. Mobility is provided by the
base stations to enhance network coverage and avoid any hotspot issues.
3. Design Considerations for a Wildfire Monitoring Application
First, we provide a brief overview of various environmental parameters which
influence the behaviour and characteristics of a wildfire within a forest. Next,
we explain various network parameters and design consideration which govern
the data collection capabilities of the sensor nodes.
3.1. Characteristics of Burning Wildfire Scenario
The behaviour of a wildfire is characterized by the following factors [27]:
Fuels, Weather Conditions and Topography. These three factors determine how
quickly a wildfire can vanish or turn into a raging blaze which may scorches
thousands of acres of land in a short period of time.
The fuels include grasses, dry leaves, twigs, shrubs and branches of the trees.
Small pieces of fuels burn quickly, particularly when they are larger in quantity,
dry and loosely arranged.
The weather also plays a crucial role in igniting and spreading a wildfire.
On a hot and windy day, fuels are at their driest which increases the risk of
a wildfire. The three weather ingredients, i.e. temperature, relative humidity
and wind speed have the ability to ignite and spread a wildfire to engulf a vast
region. Temperature has a direct impact on fire ignition because the fuels are
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closer to their ignition points at a very high temperature. Each fuel has a flash
point, a temperature reading at which it bursts into flames. The typical flash
point for various types of dried fuels is2 3000C. At flash point, the fuels release
hydrocarbon gases that mixes with oxygen in the air and causes wildfire due to
combustion. Relative humidity is the percentage of moisture in the air. It has
an adverse impact on the intensity and flammability of a wildfire. During hot
summer days and dry conditions, humidity is relatively low and it adds to the
possibility of a wildfire as the fuels do not have sufficient moisture in the air to
absorb. The possibility of a wildfire increases when the relative humidity drops
below 30% (critical point) in the air. Wind supplies oxygen which further dries
the fuels and spreads the fire across a wide geographical region. The stronger
the wind blows, the faster a wildfire will spread. The threshold wind speed
of 12-15 km/h has a significant impact on the behaviour of a wildfire. Low
relative humidity coupled with strong winds and high temperature readings
rapidly spread a wildfire.
Topography or the slope of a land also influences the behaviour of a wildfire.
Topography can either aid or hinder the progression of a wildfire because a fire
spreads quickly and much faster up a slope and slow down as it goes down a
slope.
Among these three factors, weather condition is highly crucial in igniting
and spreading a wildfire. Furthermore, the behaviour of a fuel and topography
are characterised by weather forecast as well. It is for this reason that we
have formulated our network model based on the flash point, critical point and
threshold values of the three weather ingredients. Temperature and relative
humidity ignite a wildfire while the speed of wind facilitates in spreading it.
3.2. Network Parameters and Design Consideration
In WSNs, the source nodes located in close vicinity of each other capture
somewhat identical data packets [28]. If such data is transmitted to a base sta-
2http://science.howstuffworks.com/nature/natural-disasters/wildfire.htm
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tion, it may flood the whole network with multiple copies of the same data. To
avoid data redundancy, an end user specifies various conditions for data trans-
mission. In a wildfire monitoring application, an end user is mainly interested in
threshold values of certain environmental parameters. Threshold values enable
an end user in taking swift actions according to the environmental conditions.
In our proposed scheme, each normal node is equipped with three sensors for
monitoring temperature, relative humidity and wind speed within a forest. Each
node remains in sleep mode and wakes up only when the threshold conditions
are satisfied by the captured data. The sleep-awake scheduling of our approach
enhances network lifetime by reducing the energy consumption. Upon capturing
the events of interest, they are locally processed and relayed back to a nearest
base station. Similar to Threshold-sensitive Energy Efficient-sensor Network
(TEEN) [29] protocol, the operation of these nodes is governed by hard and soft
threshold values.
Hard threshold (HT ) is the minimum value of a sensed event which triggers
a sensor to operate. A sensor node remains idle or in sleep mode until HT is
reached. For our proposed network model, HT is set to 100
0C for temperature
reading, 40% for relative humidity and 8 km/h for wind speed. These values
of HT are stored locally in each node as a reference for future readings. Recall
that the temperature’s flash point is 3000C, relative humidity’s critical point is
below 30% and wind speed’s threshold is 12 − 15 km/h. These values are the
maximum threshold readings for environmental parameters at which a wildfire
ignites and spread across the forest. The end user needs to be informed well
before the maximum threshold readings. It is for this reason that we have set
the values of HT for temperature, relative humidity and wind speed to inform
an end user well before any emergency situation. Each node sends an alert
packet to a nearest base station when HT is reached for these parameters. The
alert packets are constantly transmitted to keep an end user up-to-date about
the current status of a forest. In a wildfire monitoring application, an end user
is not interested in an incoming alert packet for which the HT reading is similar
to the previous one.
11
To ensure that the incoming alert packet has a different reading than the
previous ones, we set a soft threshold (ST ) for each parameter. ST is an in-
cremental change in the value of a sensed event which triggers the transmitter
of a sensor to capture packets and relay them to a nearby base station. In our
proposed approach, ST is set to 40
0C for temperature, 2% for relative humidity
and 1 km/h for wind speed.
Therefore, the transmitter of each sensor will be triggered for the first time
when HT is 100
0C for temperature, 40% for relative humidity and 8 km/h
for wind speed. In the second time, it will be triggered when HT is 140
0C for
temperature, 38% for relative humidity and 9 km/h for wind speed. In the third
time, it will be triggered when HT is 180
0C for temperature, 36% for relative
humidity and 10 km/h for wind speed. This process of adjusting the values
of HT continues and alert packets are transmitted to a nearest base station on
regular intervals. The value of ST is added to the previous HT value in order
to obtain a new HT value for the current round. The threshold values of HT
and ST provide sufficient time for an end user to take precautionary measures
in an emergency situation within a forest.
4. Detection of Sybil Attack in a Forest Wildfire Monitoring Appli-
cation
In this section, we provide a detailed explanation of our proposed scheme.
First, the architectural model of our network is presented followed by its de-
ployment model. Next, two different approaches for Sybil attack detection are
presented. Sybil nodes are detected prior to cluster formation and cluster head
selection. This ensures that only legitimate nodes are elected as cluster heads.
Once Sybil nodes are barred from cluster head selection, a cluster-based hierar-
chical network is formed to obtain environmental data based on the conditions
specified by an end user.
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4.1. Network Architectural Model
The network architectural model of our proposed scheme is depicted in Fig-
ure 1. In this figure, Sybil attack detection and cluster-based algorithm are
supported at the network layer. During routing, the forged identities of Sybil
nodes are detected to prevent their participation in cluster head selection. The
three environmental parameters of temperature, relative humidity and wind
speed are supported at the application layer. The goal of Sybil nodes is to
sneak into the network and provide false-negative alert readings of these envi-
ronmental parameters to an end user. Furthermore, the presence of lossy links
and a hostile environment pose a potential threat that some of these Sybil nodes
may sneak through the detection process due to varying signal strength at differ-
ent time intervals. The escaped Sybil nodes are ultimately detected by the base
stations to prevent their participation in cluster head selection. However, the
escaped Sybil nodes are still eligible to participate in the network as legitimate
non-cluster head nodes. This is because the normal nodes in the network have
no idea about the identities of other normal nodes or Sybil nodes. However, the
malicious data of Sybil nodes are ultimately discarded by the base stations to
prevent its usage during critical decision-making.
4.2. Network Deployment Model
Our proposed network model consists of 200 normal nodes and 20 high-
energy nodes deployed in a wide geographical region of 100× 100 square meter
area. The normal nodes are equipped with 2 joules while high-energy nodes
are having 5 joules of residual energy. high-energy nodes assist the base sta-
tions in Sybil attack detection and relay back vital information. The number
of nodes in the network affects the quality of delivered data and security provi-
sioning. With the increase of the number of nodes, the number of transmitted
packets increases which ultimately leads to higher end-to-end delay, retransmis-
sion attempts, packet loss, in-network processing, network congestion and QoS
degradation. These metrics increase the exploitation of network resources and
energy consumption of the nodes. Moreover, securing a network of 200 normal
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Figure 1: Network Architectural Model
nodes from various attacks incurs less overhead as compared to a network of
1000 normal nodes.
We use joint-sink mobility [30], in which two base stations are used to avoid
hotspot problems within the geographical region. Both of these base stations
support to-and-fro motion to cover a subset of the nodes. Base station 1 moves
horizontally between the coordinates (25, 25) and (75, 25), while base station
2 moves horizontally between the coordinates (25, 75) and (75, 75) as shown
in Figure 2. Unlike a random waypoint mobility model [31] that suits mobile
nodes, we are more interested in the sink mobility, also known as base station
mobility. Our model does not support mobile nodes as it will bring too much
fluctuation which ultimately affects the ratio of RSSI values. The fluctuation
in RSSI enables Sybil nodes to sneak through the detection process and as a
result, such nodes may be reported as normal, also known as legitimate nodes,
to the base station. Both base stations provide sufficient coverage to the nodes
by partitioning the geographical region equally between themselves. To-and-fro
motion ensures that disjoint regions are covered and the source nodes no longer
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require long-haul transmissions to the two base stations.
In a wildfire monitoring and many other delay-sensitive applications, a sin-
gle base station may not be sufficient to provide complete network coverage in
a wide geographical region. In these applications, the source nodes generate
critical events which need to be reported immediately to a base station [32].
Missing one or more such events may result in a wrong interpretation of the
forest environment which may lead to catastrophic circumstances. A single
base station may require constant movement with a predefined velocity to en-
sure that critical events are not lost [33]. The nodes located at extreme ends
will require long-haul transmissions to reach the nearest base station. As a re-
sult, a considerable amount of energy on part of these nodes will be consumed.
Such long-haul transmissions ultimately lead to hotspot problems [34], in which
network connectivity and geographical coverage are seriously jeopardized. The
consequences get worsen if the transmitted data is highly-prioritized. The trans-
mission of such highly-prioritized data over long-haul communication channels
will make the data useless if it does not reach within its time-stamp. In our pro-
posed scheme, a series of critical events are detected based on the hard and soft
thresholds of the environmental parameters. The two base stations constantly
move around the sensor field to ensure that time-critical and delay sensitive
events generated due to on-demand queries are not lost. Our mobility model
avoids long-haul transmissions and ensures that the two base stations do not
end up in the same geographical region.
4.3. Detection of Sybil Attack
Before environmental monitoring to proceed, each node needs to authen-
ticate itself to ensure that only legitimate nodes are elected as cluster heads.
To minimize the consequences of a malicious activity, Sybil nodes are barred
from cluster head selection. In doing so, network stability, efficiency and en-
ergy consumption are enhanced. In WSNs, each node has the ability to adjust
its transmission power to reach a far distant node [35]. Using this feature of
WSNs, one or more Sybil nodes may cover a wide geographical region by form-
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ing multiple clusters with each one of their forged identities as a separate cluster
head. In a wildfire monitoring application, Sybil identities may result in catas-
trophic circumstances by constantly providing vague results to an end user. If
such identities are elected as cluster heads, they may discard time-critical and
decision-making data of member nodes within each cluster. Instead, they may
either fabricate their own data or transmit data from those member nodes which
is less critical and may not be useful for an end user to take precautionary mea-
sures within a forest. If there is a high probability of wildfire in a particular
geographical region, they may mislead an end user into believing that there is
no such possibility of wildfire in that specific region. Furthermore, they may
divert its attention to those areas which are less vulnerable to a wildfire.
In view of the above discussion, we propose two different techniques for Sybil
attack detection in a forest wildfire monitoring application. Our first approach
is based on RSSI of the transmitter nodes that enables the nearest two high-
energy nodes to detect Sybil nodes and their forged identities. The proposed
approach calculates the ratio of signal strength at two different time intervals
and identifies Sybil nodes if the ratio is same for multiple identities. Our second
approach is based on the residual energy of the nodes and detects Sybil nodes if
the residual energy field of two or more control packets matches. The objective
of both these approaches is to prevent Sybil nodes from electing themselves as
cluster heads as they may wreak havoc in the network. High-energy nodes are
assigned the task to detect such nodes and report them to a nearest base station
to ensure that only legitimate nodes are elected as cluster heads in each round.
4.3.1. RSSI-based Sybil Attack Detection
In our proposed scheme, a variable number of Sybil nodes with multiple
forged identities are injected before the start of each round. Both normal
nodes and Sybil nodes are isomorphic in nature, i.e., having similar capabil-
ities in terms of sensing, processing, communication and broadcasting. Each
node broadcasts control packets to its two nearest high-energy nodes as shown
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Figure 2: RSSI-based Sybil Attack Detection
Suppose that high-energy nodes, hen1 and hen2, receive control packets
from node i at time t1. At this point, high-energy nodes do not know whether
the transmitter is a normal node or a Sybil node. They determine the type of
a node based on the received signal strength. If identity of node i in control






Here, Pt is the transmitted power, k is constant, dhen1 is the Euclidean distance
between node i and hen1, and α is the path-loss exponent. The value of α de-
pends on the deployed environment. Its value is 2 for free-space, is between 1.6
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to 1.8 for buildings with line-of-sight connection, and is between 2.7 and 3.5 for
urban area, respectively [36]. The value of α represents the signal level atten-
uation caused by free space propagation, reflection, diffraction and scattering.
Furthermore, α varies with the distance between a receiver and a transmitter
node.
The value of α for a free-space environment is computed using Equation 2












The location of node i with respect to hen1 can be determined by computing
the Euclidean distance between i and hen1 using Equation 4.
dhen1 =
√
(xhen1 − xi)2 − (yhen1 − yi)2. (4)
Solving Equations 2, 3 and 4 and substituting their values into Equation
1 enable hen1 to calculate Rxhen1. At this point, hen1 creates its own control
packet and appends the value of signal strength, Rxhen1, in it and transmits the
packet to its nearest high-energy node, hen2. Recall that hen2 has received a
similar control packet from node i at time t1 and has calculated the value of
Rxhen2 using a similar procedure as hen1. Next, hen2 calculates the radio signal
















)α, when t = t1. (6)
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At time t1+t0, node i again broadcasts control packets with a different identity,
y. High-energy nodes, hen1 and hen2, perform similar operations as before and
coordinate with each other to calculate the radio signal strength ratio at hen2






)α, when t = t1 + t0. (7)
At this point of time, hen2 compares the ratios obtained at time t1 and t1 + t0.
If the difference between these two ratios is very close to zero, as shown in








A single physical node, i, has forged multiple identities, x and y, to its nearest
high-energy nodes at different time intervals. As the radio signal strength ratios
are equal, it means that the locations are also the same for alleged multiple
identities. The procedure for RSSI-based Sybil attack detection is shown in
Algorithm 1.
The RSSI-based scheme detects Sybil nodes based on the received signal
strength at high-energy nodes. The value of a signal strength is influenced by
various factors such as reflection, refraction, physical obstacles, channel impair-
ment, transmitter power, antenna type and distance between a transmitter and
a receiver node. Furthermore, the strength of a signal also depends on Line-
of-Sight (LoS) and Non-Line-of-Sight (NLoS) radio transmissions. In a typical
forest environment, NLoS transmission along with channel impairment causes
significant reflection and refraction of radio signals through various obstacles
that results in highly fluctuating RSSI values. As a result, the quality of a sig-
nal strength is quite poor so that one or more Sybil nodes may sneak through
the detection process. The fluctuating values of the received signal strengths at
time, t1, and time, t1 + t0, may result in varying RSSI ratios. The differences in
these ratios are sufficient to convince nearby high-energy nodes into believing
that a transmitter is not a Sybil node. In this fashion, one or more identities of
Sybil nodes go undetected and are reported to a nearest base station as normal
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Algorithm 1 RSSI-based Sybil Attack Detection
1: Input: Ei, n, s, m, α, k . Ei represents the residual energy of node i, n and
s represent the number of normal nodes and number of Sybil nodes, respectively,
m represents the maximum number of forged identities of each sybil node, and α
and k are those appeared in Equation 5.
2: Output: {Sybil or non-Sybil}
3: Initialization:
(a) Node i is assigned Ei . ∀ i ∈ N, where N=n+s
(b) Normal node i is assigned an identity, IDi . ∀ i ∈ n, IDi ∈
{ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn}
(c) Generate s Sybil nodes: sybj , where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s}, and s =
round(rand(1) ∗ s) + 1; . Generate a random number of s Sybil nodes in
each round. At least, one Sybil node is generated in each round using rand
and round functions.
(d) Generate m forged identities: idl, where l ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, and m =
round(rand(1) ∗m) + 2; . Each Sybil node i has a random number of m
identities. The value of 2 is added to obtain at least two identities for each
Sybil node in each round.
4: for i = 1 to N do
5: for b = 1 to c do . c represents the number of high-energy nodes, c=20
6: Calculate Euclidean distance, dib, between nodes i and the b-th high-energy
node as shown in Equation 4.
7: Sort dib in ascending order to get two nearest high-energy nodes, i.e., the
b′-th and b′′-th high-energy nodes, where b′, b′′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c}.
At time, t1
8: SEND (Ei, IDi) . Node i sends its control packets to the b
′-th and b′′-th
high-energy nodes, where, node i may be normal or Sybil.
9: Calculate Rb′ . Calculate the received power as shown in Equation 1
10: Calculate Rb′′ . Calculate the received power as shown in Equation 1
11: Next, the b′-th high-energy node transmits Rb′ to the b
′′-th
high-energy node
12: Calculate Rb′′/Rb′ . Calculate the ratio using Equation 5.
At time, t1 + t0, Repeat Step 8-12
13: Compare both ratios . Obtained at times t1 and t1 + t0
14: if Ratios are equal and having similar identities for node i then
Node i is Sybil
15: else






High-energy nodes have a fair detection policy that is equally applicable to
both normal nodes and Sybil nodes. high-energy nodes have no prior knowledge
if a node is normal or Sybil. For high-energy nodes, undetected Sybil nodes are
also normal nodes. Furthermore, undetected Sybil nodes try to participate in
cluster head selection as well. In fact, it is the ultimate goal of these nodes to
be elected as cluster heads because, in that way, they may wreak havoc and
disrupt the whole network operation. To prevent such catastrophic situation,
we implement a two-tier detection process: one at high-energy nodes and the
other at the two base stations. The Sybil nodes may sneak through the detec-
tion process at high-energy nodes due to the fluctuating RSSI values within a
forest. However, it is highly improbable that such nodes may sneak through
the detection process at the base stations. Unlike high-energy nodes, each base
station maintains the identities of the normal nodes locally within a database.
In case of Sybil nodes, there will be a mismatch of identities and they will be
barred from participation in cluster head selection.
At first glance, it seems that the detection mechanism deployed at the high-
energy nodes may not be necessarily required because the two base stations
guarantee to detect each and every Sybil node. However, apart from Sybil nodes,
there are 200 normal nodes in the network as well. It will put a lot of burden
on these nodes in terms of resource consumption if they transmit their control
packets directly to the two base stations. To avoid long-haul transmissions, we
deploy the detection mechanism at high-energy nodes to reduce the resource
consumption (i.e., energy consumption) of the nodes and network, end-to-end
delay, packet loss and congestion.
4.3.2. Residual Energy-based Sybil Attack Detection
Here, we propose another scheme for Sybil attack detection based on the
residual energy of each node. Unlike a normal node, each Sybil node requires
multiple transmissions of control packets to validate its forged identities. A Sybil
node forges four different identities to its nearest high-energy nodes as shown
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in Figure 3a. Recall that all the forged identities of a Sybil node reside in a
single physical location. To authenticate its illegitimate identities, a Sybil node
transmits two control packets for each one of them. It requires four different
such transmissions and in each transmission, it appends one of its illicit identity.
Each control packet contains residual energy, Ei, and forged identity of a Sybil
node.
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(b) Queue of a high-energy Node
Figure 3: Residual Energy-based Sybil Attack Detection
Upon reception of control packets, each high-energy node retrieves the iden-
tity (node ID) and residual energy from them and stores them locally within
a queue as shown in Figure 3b. The Sybil node has launched an attack by
transmitting four different pairs of control packets for its forged identities. high-
energy node can detect such an attack by examining the residual energy field of
each control packet. If there is a match between residual energy fields of two or
more control packets and a mismatch between their identities, it means that a
Sybil attack has occurred. In that case, the forged identities are reported to a
nearest base station. It is possible that there may be a match between residual
energy field of a normal node and that of a forged identity of a Sybil node. To
rule out such possibility, we calculate the precision of the residual energy field
up to 5 decimal digits. This value ensures that it is highly unlikely that there
will be a match between residual energy of a normal node and forged identities
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of a Sybil node.
In this scheme, we implement our logic using two high-energy nodes in order
to detect and compare the information on the forged identities in the network.
Furthermore, we calculate the residual energy whose values after five decimal
digits are truncated as any values after five decimal digits are too negligible to
consider.
4.4. Cluster-based Hierarchical Network
After Sybil attack detection, a cluster-based hierarchical network is formed.
This network consists of two phases, a set-up phase and a steady-state phase.
During set-up phase, cluster heads selection, spatial queries distribution, sched-
ule creation and cluster formation taken place. The creation of schedule, i.e.,
allocation of time division multiple access (TDMA) slots, within a cluster en-
ables the member nodes to share the transmission medium. This concept of slot
allocation enables the nodes within a cluster to remain inactive for most of their
lifetime and at the same time avoid contention for transmission over a wireless
link. The completion of set-up phase is initiated by steady-state phase during
which each cluster head collects data as specified in each query that contains
HT and ST values for the three environmental parameters. Each base station
has the ability to modify or discard HT or ST at any time and transmits new
queries according to an end user requirements. Furthermore, the base station
may request data from specific nodes using on-demand queries. First, we explain
the set-up phase followed by the steady-state phase.
4.4.1. Set-up Phase
During Sybil attack detection, both normal nodes and Sybil nodes communi-
cate with nearby high-energy nodes to authenticate themselves for participation
in network communication. Once Sybil nodes are detected, they are reported
to a nearest base station. Each high-energy node creates a control packet and
transmits to a nearest base station. This packet contains the residual energy
fields of normal nodes, their identities and forged identities of detected Sybil
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nodes. Those Sybil nodes that sneak through the detection process are re-
ported as normal nodes because high-energy nodes consider only those nodes,
which satisfy the detection criteria, as normal. From their perspective, normal
nodes along with undetected Sybil nodes are eligible to participate in cluster
head selection. However, this is not the case at the two base stations because
they know the identity of each normal node within the network. Based on the
identity verification at base stations, undetected Sybil nodes are barred from
participation in cluster head selection. The base stations maintain two queues:
a blacklisted queue and a cluster head eligible queue. Sybil nodes detected
by high-energy nodes and those detected by the base stations are stored in the
blacklisted queue while normal nodes become part of cluster head eligible queue.
The Sybil nodes that sneak through the detection process at high-energy
nodes are ultimately detected by the base stations and barred from participation
in cluster head selection. However, it does not mean that they cannot commu-
nicate with the elected cluster heads. The base stations prevent them only from
participation in cluster head selection but such nodes can still communicate as
member nodes with their respective cluster heads. Only those Sybil nodes that
were detected earlier by high-energy nodes are permanently disabled. They can
neither participate in cluster head selection nor as member nodes within the
network. In our proposed scheme, high-energy nodes act as gateway nodes to
a nearest base station. If a Sybil node that was detected earlier by high-energy
nodes tries to transmit sensed data, it will be discarded straight away before
reaching a base station. However, undetected Sybil nodes can still communicate
within their clusters because high-energy nodes and cluster heads consider them
as normal nodes.
Both base stations coordinate with each other on regular intervals to elect
an optimal percentage of cluster heads. The two base stations are resource-rich
entities and are fully synchronized with each other to elect a single set of cluster
heads in each round. Each base station evaluates the residual energy of normal
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where, n is the total number of normal nodes in the network and Ei is the
residual energy of normal node i. n is equal to N-s, where N is the number of
all nodes and s the total number of Sybil nodes. Recall that the Sybil nodes
detected by high-energy nodes and the sneaked Sybil nodes detected by the two
base stations are already barred from participation in cluster head selection.
A normal node having residual energy greater than average energy threshold
is eligible for cluster head selection. However, it is probable that there will be a
large number of such nodes in each round. These nodes are potential candidates
for cluster heads in a particular round. It is the job of the two base stations
to elect a desire percentage of cluster heads among candidate nodes. In our
proposed scheme, the following criteria are used for the election of a candidate
to become a cluster head:
• Is Ei of the candidate node greater than or equal to Eavg?
• Has the candidate been elected as a cluster head during the past 1p rounds?
Here, p is the optimal percentage of cluster heads and it is equal to 5% of
n.
• Is the candidate’s residual energy higher than those of other candidates
located in the same geographical region?
Each base station elects an optimal percentage of cluster heads for a particu-
lar round and broadcasts nomination packets containing their identities and end
user spatial queries. Within each spatial query, an end user specifies certain con-
ditions for collecting critical events from the source nodes within a geographical
region [38]. Initially, each cluster head is assigned a very simple query contain-
ing HT values for temperature, relative humidity and wind speed. Next, each
cluster head advertises itself to the nearest neighbouring nodes in order to form
clusters. Each advertisement message contains the identity of a specific cluster
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head and the end user’s spatial query. Each neighbouring node receives adver-
tisement messages from multiple cluster heads but it associates itself with the
one having the strongest signal strength to form a cluster.
After the cluster formation, neighbouring nodes become the non-cluster
heads or member nodes of a cluster and they must abide by the conditions
associated with the advertised query. Each node remains in sleep mode and
wakes up only when the conditions specified in the assigned query are met. An
end user may modify or discard a transmitted spatial query at any point of time.
This is because an end user only wants the data of interest in making critical
decisions. These queries are useful to collect user-specific data from the nodes
within a geographical region.
4.4.2. Steady-state Phase
In our proposed scheme, one or more member nodes may be reporting time-
critical, delay-sensitive alert packets within each cluster. These member nodes
are either normal nodes or undetected Sybil nodes. The normal nodes transmit
genuine alert packets while the undetected Sybil nodes transmit fake, i.e., false-
negative, alert packets. No matter whether the packets are genuine or fake
alerts, they are generated as a result of spatial queries distributed by the cluster
heads among the member nodes within their respective clusters. For a cluster
head, it is impossible to determine the nature of these alerts. Each cluster head
collects and aggregates alerts from member nodes and transmits to the nearest
base station using a two-hop transmission link. Each cluster head transmits
the aggregated data to a nearest high-energy node, which in turn transmits the
data to the base station. The only exception is the presence of a nearby base
station. In that case, the cluster head directly delivers data to it.
Upon reception at a base station, the identity, geographical location and
sensitivity of an alert packet are examined. A mismatch of identities between
an incoming alert packet and those stored in a base station enables the base
station to discard such packet. This comparison enables each base station to
weed out malicious and false-negative alert packets of Sybil nodes. At this point,
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the nearest base station assigns on-demand queries to those member nodes, i.e.,
normal nodes, which are reporting time-critical, delay-sensitive alert packets.
The normal nodes store these queries and report alert packets on regular inter-
vals based on the specified conditions, i.e., the hard and soft thresholds, of the
three environmental parameters. Based on these conditions, the member nodes
generate alerts packets that need to be reported immediately to the nearest base
station.
Each cluster head consumes a considerable amount of time in data aggre-
gation, in-network processing and relaying back the data to a base station. To
avoid delay and maintain the integrity of time-stamp of each alert packet, the
nearest base station collects such alerts and relays them back to an end user.
These alerts are generated as a result of the conditions specified in on-demand
queries, assigned to normal nodes. Based on the gathered data, an end user de-
cides what to do in the next step. If a subset of neighbouring nodes is reporting
sensitive alert packets on a regular interval, the end user informs a rescue team
in order to take precautionary measures within a forest. An end user evaluates
the aggregated data from each perspective before declaring an emergency situ-
ation within a forest. The two phases of our cluster-based hierarchical network
are shown in Figure 4. The completion of set-up and steady-state phases is
coined as one complete round. Our proposed cluster-based hierarchical network
is iterative in nature and operates in rounds to collect data within a forest.
In Algorithm 2, the generation, transmission and outcome of a simple spatial
query are shown. The base stations elect an optimal set of cluster heads, optCH ,
and append HT values of temperature, relative humidity and wind speed in
each control packet, ctri for each cluster head, CHi. Here, optCH = {CH1,
CH2,....,CHopt}, opt ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. The base stations also append the identity,
latitude (LatT) and longitude (LongT), of CHi, in ctri. Next, ctri is sent to
a neighbourinhigh-energyenergy node, heni, for ultimate transmission to CHi.
Each CHi gathers alert packets from member nodes based on the specifications
in ctri and transmits them to a nearby base station that evaluates the nature
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Figure 4: Clustering-based Hierarchical Network
does not match with identities in DatabaseBS stored within a base station, the
incoming alert packets of CHx are discarded and it is considered as a Sybil node.
Each base station prevents data from CHx to reach an end user. A match of
identity N -CHx means that CHx is a legitimate node and its alert packets are
further evaluated for the possibility of assigning an on-demand query to this
node.
Once data are collected from each cluster head, the two base stations further
analyse this data. The dynamic nature of happening events (wildfire in this
case) is not restricted to a particular geographical location. Moreover, the
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Algorithm 2 Generation, Transmission and Outcome of Spatial Query
1: procedure Spatial Query
2: for each identity of a cluster head, CHi ∈ optCH do
3: Create a control packet, ctri
4: Append HT along with LatT, LongT of CHi in ctri
5: SEND ctri to heni
6: end for
7: if N-CHx /∈ DatabaseBS then
8: Discard the incoming alert packets from CHx
9: else
10: Further Evaluation of alert packets
11: end if
12: end procedure
data collected from various geographical regions may have different temperature,
relative humidity and wind speed readings. Both base stations carefully examine
the data before delivering them to an end user. During this process, the nodes
that have highly sensitive data are analysed and assigned on-demand queries.
In Algorithm 3, a subset of nodes are assigned an on-demand query. This query
probes a total of 6 nodes to obtain specific values for temperature, relative
humidity and wind speed. Furthermore, the incoming alert packets must have
a time-stamp otherwise they will be discarded. The allocation of on-demand
queries is restricted to legitimate nodes only because the base stations have
already discarded alert packets of undetected (sneaked) Sybil nodes in Algorithm
2.
Algorithm 3 Generation and Outcome of an On-demand Query
1: procedure On-Demand Query
2: SELECT Temp, R.H, W.S, Timestamp FROM Nodes
3: WHERE (Node ID = 2 TO 7) ∧ (Temp>= 219, R.H< 0.34, W.S> 10)
4: if Collected data is Time stamped then
5: End user checks data pattern collected from nodes in the above range
6: else




5. Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, we provide a series of simulation results for our proposed
scheme. We use a 100 × 100 square meter geographical area for our network
deployment. Normal nodes and Sybil nodes are isomorphic in terms of battery
power, storage and processing capabilities. We use First-order radio model [39]
to minimize the energy consumption of nodes by efficiently scheduling their
duty-cycles. Next, we evaluate our scheme in terms of detection rate, accuracy
of the application, network lifetime and average size of the clusters. These
parameters are calculated for a period of up to 30000 rounds.
5.1. Detection of Sybil Attack
Figure 5a illustrates the effect of s Sybil nodes and their |m| forged identities
on the detection rate for a network of s=20 and n=300. The value of m varies
between 10 and 26. The detection rate increases with the increase in the value
of m. In comparison with Ssu et al. [23], the detection rate of our approach is
slightly lower at high-energy nodes. However, we have a better detection rate
at the two base stations. Unlike their detection scheme, our proposed scheme
operates in a hostile environment within a forest that causes high fluctuation in
RSSI values. As a result, one or more identities of Sybil nodes sneak through
the detection process at high-energy nodes in various rounds resulting in a lower
detection rate. However, our proposed scheme has a 100% detection rate at
the two base stations and all previously sneaked identities are detected at this
stage. It is the ultimate goal of our proposed approach that all Sybil nodes and
their forged identities are prevented from cluster head participation and a 100%
detection rate achieves that objective.
In Figure 5b, Sybil nodes are detected based on their residual energy con-
sumptions. The comparison is made for a network of 200 normal nodes and up
to 15 Sybil nodes. In most of the rounds, Sybil nodes consume more energy as
compared to normal nodes because each Sybil node forges |m| identities. The
energy consumption varies with m identities forged by each Sybil node over the
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Figure 5: Detection of Sybil Attack
of Sybil nodes is contributed toward the number of transmitted control packets
that are used to validate their forged identities.
5.2. Accuracy of Wildfire Monitoring Application
The accuracy of the proposed wildfire application, φwildfire, is a percentage
value that is calculated as the number of genuine alerts denoted by N to the





In Equation 10, we calculate the accuracy of our wildfire monitoring application
in presence of up to 20 Sybil nodes. Each Sybil node is capable of forging up to
10 identities.
In Figure 6a, the data packets of the three environmental parameters cap-
tured over the span of network lifetime are shown. These packets are generated
by the normal nodes and Sybil nodes. Furthermore, these packets may or may
not be alert packets. Each data packet is an alert packet if it satisfies the HT
and ST conditions specified for an environmental parameter. Let Temp repre-
sent the temperature reading, RH represent the relative humidity reading and
WS represent the wind speed reading sensed by a member node. This node will
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Figure 6: Accuracy of the Wildfire Monitoring Application
transmits an alert packet to its respective cluster head only when Equation 11
is satisfied.
(Temp ≥ HTemp) ∧ ((RH ≥ HRH) ∨ (WS ≥ HWS)) = True, (11)
where, HTemp, HRH and HWS are the hard thresholds for temperature, relative
humidity and wind speed. An alert is generated and transmitted only when
HTemp is reached and either HRH or HWS is reached. Equation 11 is user-
specific and may be modified according to the demands of an end user. This is
because an on-demand query has different conditions for an alert transmission
as compared to a spatial query. As previously discussed, an on-demand query
is highly generalized and assigned to a member node based on the outcome of a
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spatial query. For example, an end user may require only temperature alerts of
above 2000C from a specific geographical region and may not be interested in
relative humidity and wind speed alerts within the same region. In that case,
Equation 11 will change accordingly. The alerts include both genuine and fake
readings as shown in Figure 6b. Fake alerts belong to the forged identities of
one or more Sybil nodes while the genuine alerts belong to the normal node. In
Figure 6b, there are as many as 147 genuine alerts and up to 20 fake alerts in
various rounds. In Figure 6c, the percentage accuracy of our wildfire monitoring
application is obtained using genuine and fake alerts of Figure 6b.
5.3. Lifetime of the Network
The lifetime of a network is defined in terms of stability period and instability
region. Stability period is the point of time when the first node dies while
instability region is the point of time when there are not sufficient nodes to
form balanced clusters. In [40], the authors argued that a network is unable
to sustain balanced clusters when 97% of its nodes die. Using their argument,
we have compared our proposed approach with LEACH, SEP and PASCCC
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Figure 7: Lifetime of the Network
Unlike LEACH and SEP protocols, the sensor nodes in our approach wake
up only when HT is reached for each environmental parameter. The use of
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HT and ST within the spatial and on-demand queries efficiently manages the
sleep-awake scheduling of the nodes. On the other hand, PASCCC protocol
uses HT and ST parameters. However, the selection of cluster heads is similar
to LEACH and SEP that enable each node to elect itself as cluster head irre-
spective of its residual energy. The threshold-based event detection along with a
centralized cluster head selection significantly improves the stability period and
instability region of our scheme. In our proposed scheme, the instability region
reaches in round 28322 and has a 62% improvement over the nearest reading,
i.e., PASCCC protocol. In terms of stability period, our proposed scheme has
almost 3 times better performance as compared to PASCCC protocol. In Figure
7b, we calculate the network lifetime of our proposed approach in the presence
and absence of high-energy nodes. The presence of only 20 high-energy nodes
may have less impact on the lifetime of the network, however, they perform vital
tasks of Sybil attack detection to the base stations.
Apart from Sybil attack detection, high-energy nodes minimize network con-
gestion, retransmission attempts, packet loss, and energy consumption. In ab-
sence of high-energy nodes, each normal node will use a single-hop long-haul
communication channel to reach the base station. Such transmissions will lead
to higher packet loss, delay, congestion and degradation in Quality of Service
(QoS). In our proposed scheme, the presence of high-energy nodes reduces long-
haul transmissions to the base station. For every n packets received, a higher
energy node transmits only a single packet to the base station as discussed in
subsection 4.4.1. As a result, the probability of congestion, packet loss and
packet retransmission attempts is reduced. Moreover, the amount of time re-
quired in retransmitting a lost/missing packet to a high-energy node is much
smaller compared to the time required in a retransmission attempt intended for
a base station. Next, we present the energy consumption analysis of any normal
node in the presence and absence of high-energy nodes.
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5.3.1. Analysis of Energy Consumption
The energy consumption, En, of any normal node in absence of high-energy
nodes is calculated as shown in Equation 12.
En = kEelec + kEampd
4
BS , where d ≥ dc. (12)
Here, Eelec is the energy consumption of the processing unit of a normal node
in executing a k -bit packet, Eamp is the energy consumption of the amplifier
component in transmitting a k-bit packet and dBS is the distance between a
normal node and a base station and it is always greater than or equal to crossover
distance, dc [14].
The energy consumption of any normal node in presence of high-energy
nodes is calculated as shown in Equation 13.
En = kEelec + kEampd
2
HEN , where d<dc. (13)
Here, dHEN is the distance between a normal node and its nearest high-
energy node and is always less than dc [14].
Comparing Equation 12 and 13, the energy consumption of a normal node is
much smaller in presence of high-energy node because dHEN<dBS . Recall that
the data transmission via high-energy nodes involves two-hop communication.
The decrease in energy consumption is contributed much towards the second hop
because it is the high-energy nodes that perform data transmission on behalf of
their nearest neighbouring normal nodes.
5.4. Average Size of the Clusters
This parameter determines the efficiency of an algorithm in terms of data ag-
gregation and geographical coverage [26]. The average size of a cluster, C average,
is defined as the ratio of number of alive nodes to the number of clusters within
a network and is calculated using Equation 14.
Caverage =




where, nalive denotes the number of alive nodes participating in cluster for-
mation and CH denotes the number of clusters. In cluster-based hierarchical
routing protocols, there is one cluster head per cluster and both these parame-
ters are always equal. The average size of a cluster expresses the efficiency of an
algorithm in terms of data aggregation, data fusion and the minimum number
of cluster heads required to cluster a large geographical network. In Figure 8a,
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Figure 8: Coverage of a Geographical Region
Our proposed scheme has a significantly higher Caverage as compared to
DEECIC and LEACH protocols. Our algorithm is centralized in nature and
elects an optimal percentage of cluster heads in each round. On the other hand,
DEECIC and LEACH are randomly distributed in nature and cannot guarantee
an optimal percentage of cluster heads in each round. The selection of an
optimal percentage of cluster heads means a uniform distribution of network
load, better coverage, high throughput, better data aggregation and low delay
within each cluster [41]. In LEACH and DEECIC protocols, each node elects
itself as cluster head based on a generated random number [14]. As a result,
either too many or very few cluster heads are elected in each round so that
unbalanced clusters occur. Too many member nodes within a cluster increase
the load on a cluster head and very few member nodes make the concept of
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clustering rather inefficient and ineffective. In Figure 8b, the total number of
cluster heads elected in each round are shown for a network of 100 normal nodes.
Irrespective of the candidate nodes, each round results in 4 or 5 cluster heads
as long as the network is stable. As we are using a centralized approach, the
base station elects an optimal percentage of cluster heads among the candidate
nodes. Figure 8a is derived based on the statistics of Figure 8b. As discussed
earlier, Caverage is the ratio of number of alive nodes (candidates nodes of Figure
8b) to the total number of clusters in each round. The number of clusters is
always equal to the number of cluster heads.
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes two different techniques for Sybil attack detection for a
forest wildfire monitoring application. A two-tier detection technique uses high-
energy nodes operating at a lower level to detect forged identities of Sybil nodes.
Due to the hostile environment within in a forest, one or more identities may
sneak through the detection process. These identities are ultimately detected
by the two base stations operating at a higher level. A residual energy-based
detection technique uses the residual energy of each node to detect a possible
Sybil attack at the high-energy nodes. If two or more incoming control packets
have the same residual energy but different identities, it means that a Sybil at-
tack has been launched by an adversary. The main objective of these techniques
is to prevent Sybil identities from participation in cluster head selection. After
a Sybil attack detection, an optimal percentage of cluster heads are selected by
the base stations using a centralized approach. Each cluster head is assigned
a spatial query to collect data about the environmental parameters within a
forest. Each cluster head advertises itself to its neighbouring nodes in order
to form clusters and collect data from member nodes. The data collected from
member nodes may belong to either normal nodes or sneaked Sybil identities of
Sybil nodes. To deceive an end user, the sneaked Sybil identities may broad-
cast high volume of false-negative alerts. The two base stations remain vigilant
to prevent any such alerts from reaching an end user. Only incoming genuine
37
alerts from normal nodes are analyzed, and, if any of them is of significant
importance, the base stations assign on-demand queries to the origin of those
alerts, i.e. the source nodes. Our proposed approach has fully implemented spa-
tial queries, however on-demand queries are yet to be implemented. Currently,
we are implementing high level advanced on-demand queries that will probe all
those member nodes who claim to have highly critical alert packets. Moreover,
the selection of cluster heads is computationally complex and large overhead
is involved. This problem can be improved further in our future work using a
rather simple logic.
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